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Abstract 
The finding that misleading post-event information can impair subjects' 
reporting of originally presented items has led to numerous theoretical 
explanations: It is alternatively being suggested that the effect is due to demand 
characteristics, response bias (McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985a), overwriting of 
information (Loftus, 1975), retrieval impairment (Christiaansen & Ochalek, 
1983), trace integration (Loftus, i 977), or source misattribution (Lindsay 
& Johnson, 1988}. Two experiments were conducted which demonstrated that 
when a misleading, interpolated face was presented after an original event face 
subjects most frequently selected a blend face option on the recognition test, 
representing aspects of both faces shown. It is argued that demand 
characteristics, response bias, source misattribution or overwriting cannot 
account for the results found. Instead, a summed similarity exemplar model or 
a prototype model are suggested as the most cogent theoretical frameworks for 
explaining the misinformation effects found. 
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Introduction 
The efficacy of eyewitness testimony has been under question for some time 
(e.g. Buckhout, 1974). It has been suggested that the most likely cause of the 
wrong conviction, assuming the integrity of the legal system, is mistaken 
identity (Cole & Pringle, 1974). The ease with which witnesses make 
mistakes in personal identification also has interesting implications for the 
way memory works and how information is represented in the brain. 
Experimental studies assessing the accuracy of memory in simulated 
eyewitness testimony situations concur with the real life accounts in 
concluding that memory is imperfect and easily influenced by factors such as 
misleading information (Loftus, 1975). The basic design of these eyewitness 
memory experiments is as follows: Subjects are visually presented with an 
event, such as an auto-pedestrian accident or simulated robbery; half of the 
subjects are then exposed to misleading information, that is, it is suggested that 
subjects saw certain items which weren't in fact present in the original event. 
Subjects who received misleading information are subsequently impaired in 
their recognition or recall memory response for the original event item or 
items. This influence of post-event misleading information on memory 
response for an original event is termed the misinformation effect. 
The aims and general outline of this thesis are as follows: First I will review 
the experimental findings relating to the misinformation effect, focussing on 
when the effect occurs and what variables can influence its magnitude. Then I 
will examine the various theoretical approaches proposed to account for these 
findings. These explanations will be related to some wider theoretical issues 
concerning memory and memory representation. Two experiments will be 
presented which were designed to assess the validity of the various theoretical 
approaches proposed to account for misinformation effects. The results of these 
experiments will be discussed in terms of some of the ideas and theories 
elucidated in the first three sections. 
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Experimental findings 
In a series of experiments designed to test the effects of post-event misleading 
information Loftus and her colleagues (Loftus, 1975; Loftus, Miller & Burns, 
1978) got subjects to view a slide sequence depicting an auto-pedestrian 
accident. In this sequence a red Datsun was seen traveling along a street 
towards an intersection having either a stop sign or a yield sign. The car then 
turns right and knocks down a pedestrian who is crossing the road. After 
viewing the slide sequence subjects were given a questionnaire containing items 
pertaining to the event. The criticalquestion was as follows: "Did another car 
pass the red Datsun while it was stopped at the (yield) stop sign?" Half of the 
subjects received consistent information; that is, if they viewed a yield sign in 
the slide sequence then they received a question mentioning that yield sign 
whereas the other half received Inconsistent Information: The questionnaire 
presupposed that a stop and not a yield sign was present. After a 20 minute 
filler activity a forced choice recognition test was administered. Subjects were 
presented with 15 pairs of slides; for each pair, one item had been seen 
previously in the event, whereas the other slide was a novel non-viewed item. 
Subjects had to select which slide they had previously seen in the original event 
sequence. The critical slide pair was one of the red Datsun either at the yield 
sign or at the stop sign. The results demonstrate that those subjects who 
received misleading or inconsistent information were less likely (41% of 
subjects) to select the correct (original) slide than subjects who had received 
consistent information (75% correct). 
The misinformation effect has been replicated in numerous experiments, with 
different stimuli and under different conditions of encoding and retrieval. 
Whether the original event is an auto-pedestrian accident (e.g. Loftus et. al, 
1978; Bekerian & Bowers, 1983; Bowers & Bekerian, 1984), a simulated 
robbery (e.g. McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985), a single slide of a cluttered room 
(Lindsay & Johnson, 1989), a class uprising (Loftus, 1975), detailed 
pictorial nature scenes (Chandler, 1989), or faces (Jenkins & Davies, 1985; 
Gibling & Davies, 1988): All other things remaining equivalent, misleading 
information decreases reporting of the original event. 
7 
The misinformation effect has also been reported under different modes of 
post-event information presentation, whether it be in the form of verbal 
presuppositions (Loftus et. al, 1978; Bekerian & Bowers, 1983), a detailed 
narrative of the event with embedded misinformation (McCloskey & Zaragoza, 
1985) or visually presented misleading information (Jenkins & Davies, 
1985; Chandler, 1989). 
Variations at test, such as giving subjects a yes/no recall questionnaire 
(Loftus, 1975; Tversky & Tuchin, 1989; Belli, 1989) or a range of choices 
on a continuum, where this is psychologically plausible (Loftus, 1977; Belli, 
1988), both reveal effects of misleading post-event information on memory 
reporting for an original event. 
However, certain other manipulations of variables at encoding and retrieval, 
such as the type of test used, have been shown to attenuate or eliminate 
completely the effect of misleading information. In a series of experiments, 
McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985a) used a modified forced-choice recognition 
test in which subjects, instead of choosing between the original item (a 
hammer in this case) and the misleading item (a screwdriver), as in the Loftus 
et. al (1978) design, had a choice between the original item and a completely 
novel, but similar item (a wrench). Under these test conditions misled 
subjects were no more likely to report the misleading information than were 
controls. The same results were found when a modified recall, instead of 
recognition, procedure was used (Zaragoza, McCloskey & Jamis, 1987). In the 
Zaragoza et. al (1987) experiment subjects were asked questions about their 
memory for the slides that constrained the type of responses they could make. 
For example, one critical question was: "The keys to the desk drawer were 
next to a soft drink can. What BRAND of SOFT DRINK was it?" (the misleading 
item was a can of Planters peanuts). The results demonstrated that recall 
performance for control items (33%) was identical to that on misled items. As 
can be seen, the type of test used in terms of response options can affect the 
degree of misinformation reporting found. 
Another variable that affects the misinformation effect is discriminability 
between the two sources of information. When subjects are made aware of the 
difference between the two sources of information (event and post-event), the 
effect of the misleading information appears to be diminished. This general 
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finding has been revealed in a number of different studies using slightly 
different experimental procedures. If subjects are given a warning that some 
or all of the post-event information might be incorrect then their subsequent 
reporting of this information is considerably reduced. Green, Flynn and Loftus 
(1982) found that warnings were only effective when they were given prior to 
the introduction of misleading information, while Christiaansen and Ochalek 
{1983} found that subjects were no more likely than control subjects to 
report misleading information even when warnings were administered after the 
presentation of post-event information. The nature of the warning in their 
study, however, was more explicit than in the Green et. al (1982) experiment; 
also the interval between the event and post-event information was 
considerably longer than that used by Green et. al {1982), which may have 
facilitated discrimination between the two sources. 
In studies directly assessing the effects of source monitoring (Lindsay, 1990; 
Lindsay & Johnson, 1989; Zaragoza & Koshmider Ill, 1989}, the consistent 
result is that when subjects are explicitly asked to discriminate between items 
they have previously seen and items read in the post-event narrative, the 
effect of the misinformation on subsequent reporting of the event items is 
negligible, although Lindsay {1990) only found this result in the "high 
discriminability" condition of his experimental design when the post-event 
narrative was presented two days, as opposed to immediately after, the initial 
event sequence. It would seem that when the event and post-event items are 
sufficiently discriminable, reporting of the misinformation is considerably 
diminished. 
Scrutiny of the post-event information and the plausibility of the misleading 
item(s) also influence the degree of misinformation reporting. Tousignant, 
Hall and Loftus (1986) found that when subjects were instructed to read the 
post-event information more slowly and carefully there was greater detection 
of the discrepant information and a subsequent increase in the accuracy of the 
misinformed subjects on the final test. If the misleading information is 
implausible or blatantly contradictory in relation to event information the 
misinformation effect is also diminished (Loftus, 1979). Furthermore, the 
implausibility of one item seems to lead to resistance to suggestions about other 
(more subtly misleading) items (Loftus, 1979). 
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Another variable which modifies the effect of misleading information is the 
contextual environment of the testing phase. The usual recognition (or recall} 
test presents questions about items seen in random order; that is, the test 
sequence of slides or questions is not in the same order as the originally 
presented information. However, when a sequential test order is Imposed the 
effect of post-event information on reporting of original events Is diminished 
(Gibling & Davies, 1988} or completely eliminated (Bekerian & Bowers, 
1983; Bowers & Bekerian, 1984). 
In contrast to the studies cited above, various other, different, manipulations 
can increase the likelihood that subjects' final reporting will reflect the 
suggested items rather than the real ones. For example, peripheral or more 
plausible misleading items are more likely to contribute to the reporting of 
misinformation than more focal or obviously different ones (Loftus, 1979}. 
All other things remaining constant, the longer the retention interval between 
the event and the post-event Information the greater the impact of the 
misleading information. In experiment three by Loftus et. al (1978} the 
proportion of correct responses by misled subjects dropped from 40% at a 20 
minute retention interval to 20% after an interval of one week. The impact of 
the suggested information, it would seem, is greater if the original information 
was viewed at longer intervals from the suggested information and subsequent 
questionnaire. 
Describing misinformation within a parenthetical clause also leads to a higher 
degree of reporting of the misinformation by misled subjects (Loftus, 1981 }. 
For example, a luggage rack was more likely to have been reported to have been 
seen when suggested in a complex presupposition: "Was the station wagon, 
which was equipped with luggage racks, carrying a large carton?" than in a 
simple one: "Were the luggage racks on the getaway car holding a large 
carton?" 
Loftus (1981} has proposed a simple probabilistic model which predicts the 
likelihood of reporting misinformation in a given situation. According to the 
model: 
Ps = Pc Pa 
1 0 
Where Ps is the probability of reporting the suggested or misleading 
information; Pc is the probability of comprehending the post-event 
information; and Pa is the probability that the post-event information Is 
accepted as valid. Other factors which influence the reporting of 
misinformation are the discriminability between the two sources of 
information and the type of testing procedure employed. In summary, the 
misinformation effect will be reduced or eliminated when the two sources of 
information are highly discriminable or when the test conditions either 
preclude the possibility of responding with the suggested item or provide 
contextual cues that reinstate the originally viewed learning conditions. The 
effect will be larger when the event and post-event items are not particularly 
discriminable and when the subjects are given an opportunity of responding 
with the misleading item at the time of the test. 
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What is the fate of memory? - theoretical accounts of the data 
Various different theoretical models have been proposed to account for the 
effects of misinformation on subsequent reporting of original event items. It 
has been alternatively suggested that the misinformation effect is due to (i) 
trace alteration, (ii) retrieval impairment, (iii) response bias and demand 
characteristics, (iv) source misattribution, and (v) memory blending. An 
understanding of exactly why subjects so readily report seeing misleading 
items can lead to insights into the nature of memorial processing and the 
relative permanence of stored information in the brain. 
(i) Trace alteration 
The initial finding that misleading information could impair subjects' 
reporting of original event items led Loftus and her colleagues (Loftus et. al, 
1978; Loftus, 1979) to postulate that the new information 'replaces', 
'overwrites' or 'updates' the existing information so that the original 
information is irrecoverably lost. After experiencing an event an individual 
forms a representation of that event in memory. If new, potentially relevant, 
information is subsequently introduced, the original representation is updated 
or overwritten to accommodate the new information (Loftus, 1979). 
Tulving (1983) suggests that mutability of memory traces or 'engrams' is one 
of the fundamental characteristics of memory and learning. A recoding 
paradigm states that when interpolated events are introduced to subjects with 
existing representations for original events, all other variables being constant, 
impaired recollection of those original items will reflect a recoding or change 
in the memory engram (this approach is summarised in Table 1 ). 
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Bememberec Qriginal event 101er12Qlated ReQQlleQtiQ• 
~ Qf the Qrigi•al 
~ 
A Yes Yes 
B Yes Yes 
Table 1: Recoding Paradigm (modified from Tulving, 1983, p. 165) 
Exactly how the traces may be altered is an as yet unresolved issue. Loftus and 
Hoffman (1989) speculate that trace alteration could be due to a weakening of 
memory traces, a clouding of memory, unlearning, or a disintegration of 
features. However, all these terms are somewhat vague and there seems to be 
little empirical evidence to support one mechanism over the other. 
It is also possible, speculates Loftus (Loftus et. al, 1978), that the two sources 
of information may both reside in memory and that they interfere with each 
other at the time of retrieval so that there is differential access to the 
misleading item. To test this hypothesis, and to see whether the original 
memory could be retrieved under different experimental conditions, Loftus 
{Loftus et. al, 1978) told subjects, after making their original selection, that 
there might have been some misleading information in the questionnaire. 
Subjects were asked to indicate 1) what they saw (yield or stop sign) and 2) 
what their questionnaire mentioned. Few subjects who were misled changed 
their mind or indicated that there was a discrepancy between the two sources of 
information. Naturally there is a problem in this study, in that admitting to a 
difference or changing choice selection is tantamount to admitting to dishonesty 
in the original recognition test. 
As already mentioned, Greene et. al (1982) also used a warning 'in their 
experiment, and found that it was only effective when presented prior to the 
misinformation, not when it was given before the final recognition test and 
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after the misleading information. They concluded that while subjects could pick 
up the discrepancy in the misinformation when warned, they could not edit out 
misleading suggestions once encoded in memory. 
(ii) Retrieval impairment: the coexistence hypothesis 
A problem with the overwriting or permanent alteration hypothesis, as Loftus 
acknowledges (Loftus & Loftus, 1980), is that results from the 
misinformation paradigm can only be suggestive of such a permanent change in 
memory traces. As Christiaansen and Ochalek (1983) state: "One can always 
argue that the original memory still exists but the appropriate retrieval 
method was not used." (p. 468). This type of argument, of course, has been 
used, perhaps erroneously, to support the claim that all information 
'cognitively registered' is retained in memory in the form of veridical and 
unalterable memory traces (see Loftus & Loftus , 1980, for a critique of this 
view). However, in terms of the misinformation effect, if original event 
information can be retrieved after misleading information is presented, then 
this would argue against a permanent overwriting and support a coexistence 
hypothesis. 
Christiaansen and Ochalek (1983) suggest that the warnings used in the Green 
et. al (1982) and Loftus et. al (1978) studies were insufficiently explicit. 
Subsequently a clearer warning was given to subjects in the experiments 
conducted by Chrlstiaansen and Ochalek (1983). After reading the post-event 
narrative the subjects were told: "A few of the details in the description are 
inaccurate - some of the details are correct and a few are incorrect. Take a 
minute to think about the description ... " It was found that misled subjects 
could edit out the misleading information and their recognition of event items 
was equal to that of control subjects. It must be noted however that the 
analyses was restricted to items that had been previously shown to be 
remembered. Warnings may only be effective when the original information is 
well remembered. Subjects were also given a test after the initial event (and 
before the narrative). This additional test may well have strengthened the 
subjects' memories for the original Items and made them more resistant to the 
effects of misinformation. 
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Other studies which support a coexistance as opposed to overwriting hypothesis 
have manipulated variables at retrieval to demonstrate that under certain 
conditions the original information is recognized equally well by both control 
and misled subjects (Bekerian & Bowers, i 983; Bowers & Bekerian, 1984; 
Gibling & Davies, 1988). By imposing a sequential test order (one that 
mimics the sequence of the original event) as opposed to a random test order, 
Bekerian and Bowers (1983) found that recognition of an originally viewed 
item was the same for the control group (85%) as it was for misled subjects 
(87%). These results have been replicated using the same stimuli by Bowers 
and Bekerian (1984) as well as by Gibling and Davies (1988) using schematic 
faces. 
Proponents of the coexistance hypothesis have argued that forgetting is a result 
of problems in retrieving old memories that are otherwise (individually) 
present in the system. Access to original information is dependent on the 
contextual environment at retrieval and the types of retrieval cues used. 
However, although the warning and context reinstatement studies seem to 
suggest that the old information is still accessible in some form, they don't 
conclusively prove that the two pieces of information 'co-exist' as separate 
memory traces. Perhaps the event and post-event items are integrated or 
preserved in some kind of unitary memory trace: this possibility is examined 
in more depth later in the thesis. 
Loftus and colleagues have argued (Cole & Loftus, 1979; Tousignant et. al, 
1986; Loftus et. al, 1989) that if a person resolves the (potential) conflict 
between two discrepant sources of information at the time of retrieval, then 
this should be reflected in longer response times (RT) for misinformed than 
for control subjects. In several experiments it was found that RTs did not 
differ for control and misled subjects. Confidence ratings were also equivalent 
so that misinformed subjects were as confident in reporting their errors as 
non-misinformed subjects were in reporting the original information. Cole 
and Loftus argued that if there is any conflict between the two sources of 
information it must be resolved at the time the misinformation is presented. 
The problem with these types of studies is that they hinge on the idea that the 
misinformation effect may be the result of some kind of conscious deliberation 
process; it is not necessary to assume, taking into account the parallel nature 
of neural processing, that RTs will be slower if the items are represented 
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independently than if they are somehow integrated together. Although the 
reaction time data is perhaps uninformative with regards to coexistance or 
integration at either the time of the initial presentation of the misinformation 
or during the recognition test, it does seem to argue against any kind of 
conscious deliberation process of comparing discrepant items at the time of 
retrieval. Therefore the assimilation of misinformation into memory may be 
at a relatively unconscious level. 
(iii) Non-memory effects 
Although, as it has been seen, the different memory impairment hypotheses are 
difficult to tease apart, McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985a) have suggested that 
the introduction of misleading information has no effect on memory for an 
original event; or more precisely, the methodological designs used have been 
inappropriate for assessing a memory impairment hypothesis. They argue that 
demand characteristics, response bias, and misinformation acceptance can 
account for all of the discrepancy in responding between control and misled 
subjects in misinformation experiments. 
Their argument runs as follows: Because success rate isn't 100% in the 
control group, presumably not everyone can remember the original slide. 
These subjects will then be merely guessing in the recognition test and have a 
50% chance of choosing the correct item. However, subjects who have 
forgotten the original slide but received the misleading information will be 
biased in selecting the new information, for reasons other than 'overwriting' 
or 'updating'. Moreover, subjects could remember both the original and 
misleading information and select the misleading information because they 
trust the experimenters' memory better than their own. The results, then, 
could be due in part to demand characteristics. 
To counter these problems McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985a) used a similar 
experimental procedure (substituting a theft for the auto-pedestrian accident 
in the slide sequence) except that in the recognition phase subjects were given 
a choice between the original item (a hammer) and a novel item not previously 
encountered {a wrench). The misleading item was a screwdriver. This design 
is referred to as the modified recognition test. If misleading information really 
does impair memory for the original event, then the misled group should choose 
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"hammer" less often than the control group. In fact there was no difference 
between the two groups. The basic results of this experiment have also been 
replicated using a recall rather than a recognition test (Zaragoza et. al, 1987). 
In summary, McCloskey and Zaragoza conclude that misleading information has 
no effect on subjects' ability to either recall or recognize suggested 
information. The misinformation effect, they argue, can be equally well 
accounted for by response biases and/or demand characteristics inherent in the 
standard experimental design. 
However, Loftus, Schooler and Wagenaar (1985) argue that the testing 
procedure employed by McCloskey and Zaragoza was simply not sensitive 
enough to reveal the· impact of post-event information. Studies by Benzing 
(1985, cited in Loftus et. al, i 985) and Chandler (1989) also using the 
modified recognition test, were able to detect differences, with misled subjects 
performing more poorly than controls on recognition of the original item. 
However, the effect is somewhat smaller than usually obtained and different 
stimuli (Chandler, i 989) or a slightly different testing procedure (Benzing, 
1985, cited in Loftus et. al, 1985) were used. When the additional measure of 
RT is used on the modified recognition test it is found that while accuracy is 
equivalent for both misled and control subjects, RTs are significantly slower 
for those subjects that had been exposed to suggested information (Loftus, 
Danders, Hoffman & Schooler, 1989). Loftus et. al (1989) argue that 
misinformation does have an influence on subjects' memory and that the 
increased RTs on the modified test are an indication of that influence. 
As Belli (1989) suggests, another problem with the modified test paradigm is 
that it fails to allow for the possibility of preferential accessibility of the 
post-event information (by not including it in the recognition test); that is, it 
may be in memory and given an opportunity, obfuscate access to the event item. 
Furthermore, subjects could succeed in the McCloskey and Zaragoza experiment 
in two ways: (i) by correctly accepting the original information, or by (2) 
correctly rejecting the novel information. Even if subjects are not exactly 
sure what they did see, they may succeed if they know what they didn't see. For 
example, although a misled subject may not be sure whether they saw a 
screwdriver or a hammer they probably know that they did not see a wrench. 
Consequently their response choice is for the original event item. 
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To counter this problem both Belli (1989) and Tversky and Tuchin (1989) 
employed yes/no recognition tests whereby misled and control subjects were 
asked whether they had seen each item in turn (see Table 2 for a summary of 
the different designs). 
Condition Slides Narrative Loftus McCloske~ Iversk~ & 
& Z:aragoz1a I.YQbln 
Control Coke Coke Coke Coke? 
vs. vs. 7-up? 
7-up Sunkist Sunkist? 
Misled Coke 7-up Coke Coke Coke? 
vs. vs. 7-up? 
7-up Sunkist Sunkist? 
Table 2: Summar~ Qf E2:::1;2erimental Designs 
In the misled condition of Tversky and Tuchin's (1989) procedure subjects 
recognized (or said "yes" to) fewer event items than the control group, while 
responding affirmatively to more misleading items. Both control and misled 
groups were equally good at rejecting the novel foils (i.e. they knew what they 
didn't see). Tversky and Tuchin concluded that while it is impossible to know 
exactly what is happening in memory, their results make it unlikely that 
response bias or demand characteristics can account for all of the differences in 
responding between control and misled subjects. 
(iv) Source misattribution 
A different approach to the misinformation effect is to view it as the result of a 
source misattribution (e.g. Lindsay & Johnson, 1989; Lindsay, 1990). 
According to this hypothesis, subjects may be able to remember one, or both, of 
the items of information but they are unsure of the source of their memory. 
That is, they are not sure if their memory is for what they saw in the original 
event, or whether it is for suggested items in the intervening 
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narrative/questionnaire. If the post-event information is easier to gain 
'access' to for some reason (e.g. it is more recent) then there may be a bias to 
infer that its source lies in the original event. 
Experiments that have explicitly asked subjects to indicate the source of their 
memories, i.e. to indicate whether the items were 1) seen, 2) read, 3) both, or 
4) neither (Lindsay & Johnson, 1989) have demonstrated that when attention 
is directed to the source of the items, the misinformation effect is eliminated. 
Misled subjects were no more likely to claim they had seen the misleading 
items than were control subjects. Zaragoza and Koshmider Ill (1989), using a 
similar design to Lindsay and Johnson (1989), also found that misled subjects 
didn't believe that they saw the misleading items. Nor did the misinformation 
make subjects less able to remember the source of the original items. 
Lindsay (1990) manipulated discriminability between the two sources of 
information so that in the low discriminability condition the post-event 
narrative was presented immediately after the slide sequence and was read out, 
in the same (female) voice that accompanies a description of the slides. In 
contrast, subjects in the high discriminability condition heard the post-event 
narrative 48 hours after viewing the slides, and the narrative was read out in a 
different (male) voice than that which accompanied the original event. Both 
groups of subjects took part in the memory test 48 hours after the slide 
presentation. All subjects were told just prior to taking the memory test that 
any relevant information presented in the narrative was wrong and should not 
be reported. By telling subjects that information in the narrative was 
incorrect, demand characteristics and response bias should play no part in any 
results found. If source monitoring problems really do occur, subjects in the 
low, but not the high, discriminability condition will sometimes still report 
the misinformation as a true record of what they originally saw. The results 
indicated that subjects did more frequently report the misled items in the low 
discriminability condition than when source was easily discriminable. 
However, for subjects in both conditions the misleading suggestions impaired 
reporting of event details. When discriminability between original and 
misleading information is low it appears that subjects experience genuine 
source-monitoring failures which can't be accounted for in terms of demand 
characteristics or response bias. 
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The source misattribution hypothesis is given plausibility by studies conducted 
in the wider area of 'reality monitoring'. Johnson and Raye (1981) have 
demonstrated that people will quite often mistake memories of imagined events 
for memories of real ones (and vice versa). While it appears that there are 
qualitative differences between subjects' memories of real and imagined 
events, memories for perceived events often having more sensory and 
contextual details and less 'cognitive' or functional information, these 
differences are often not fully appreciated by witnesses or subjects asked to 
report them (Schooler, Gerhard & Loftus, 1986; Johnson, 1988). Indeed, 
subjects are often as confident in reporting their suggested memories as they 
are their real ones (e.g. Green et. al, 1982). 
The likelihood of source monitoring errors appears to be determined by two 
general factors: "1) the degree of similarity between the target event and 
other sources of information and 2) the stringency and appropriateness of the 
decision making criteria employed during memory." (Lindsay & Johnson, 
1989, p. 356). The conditions in many experiments designed to examine the 
effects of misleading information (e.g. Loftus et. al, 1978) are ideal for 
producing source monitoring errors. Although subjects are generally asked to 
report the item(s) that they saw, it is assumed (by subjects) that the post-
event narrative/questionnaire is a veridical record of the originally presented 
information. That is, there is no need or motivation to actively discriminate 
between the two sources. Warning studies, as cited earlier (e.g. Christiaansen 
& Ochalek, 1983) and context reinstatement experiments (e.g. Bekerian & 
Bowers, 1983) implicitly help subjects to differentiate the two sources of 
information and in consequence lead to an attenuation of the misinformation 
effect. 
Although source monitoring difficulties can clearly account for some of the 
misinformation effect results reported, the finding by Lindsay (1990) that 
suggested items are still reported even when subjects are explicitly asked not 
to, suggest some kind of genuine memory impairment problem may be involved 
as well. A source misattribution hypothesis is also uninformative.with regards 
to what is present in memory, or the underlying memory representation. It 
may be that both items somehow 'reside' or are present separately and intact in 
memory - but are sourceless, or possibly the two pieces of information are 
combined in some way to form a fused or integrated representation of the two 
source components. 
20 
(v) Memory Blends: The integration hypothesis 
The idea of blended or integrated memories has been around for some time. For 
example, Francis Gaitan, speculating on the creation of abstract areas, 
suggested: "Whenever a single cause throws different groups of brain elements 
simultaneously into excitement the result must be a blended ~emory" (Gaitan, 
1883, p. 349). 
The possibility that information might be blended or integrated in memory has 
been offered as one explanation for the misinformation effect. According to this 
viewpoint, information from the two different sources are somehow combined 
or integrated in memory so that if a real-world blend of the stimuli is 
possible, and is offered on the recognition test, it will be selected. In the case 
of the normal forced-choice recognition paradigm, performance is a matter of 
selecting the alternative most like the blend representation in memory. It is 
possible of course that the two pieces of information are represented separately 
in memory and that the blend is a result of integration at retrieval. This issue 
and its theoretical ramifications will be discussed in more depth in the section 
on 'wider theoretical issues'. 
Several experimental studies have been carried out to directly assess the 
memory blending hypothesis (notably Loftus, i 977; Belli, 1988). In the 
Loftus study subjects viewed a typical slide sequence in which the critical item 
was a green sports car; misled subjects were subsequently told that the car was 
blue. The results indicate that the misled subjects consistently chose a colour 
(when presented with a range of choices on a colour wheel) somewhere in 
between blue and green, while the control subjects selected the original green 
hue. McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985b) argue that these results reflect not a 
memory blend but a deliberate compromise between the event and post-event 
information which both reside, separately but intact, in memory. 
Belli {1988) found in his experiments that with increasing retention 
intervals subjects appeared to use prototypical knowledge about the colour of 
water pitchers (which are typically yellow, apparently) as a 'default-
allowance' to fill in (any) loss of information about the colour of the pitcher 
shown in the actual slide sequence. Subjects selected a hue which represented a 
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blend between the original information and their prototypical knowledge. A 
deliberate compromise hypothesis is based on the assumption that both pieces 
of information exist and reside in memory 'separately'. Belli (1988) argues 
that if subjects were able to accurately remember the original colour of the 
pitcher (green), on what basis would they deliberately compromise this hue, 
with typical knowledge that pitchers are yellow? 
A blending hypothesis is useful in that it can account for all of the empirical 
data; or more accurately, none of the studies carried out can discount a blending 
explanation. Within the standard recognition test paradigm (e.g. Loftus et. al, 
1978), it might be assumed that the memory for the items is a blend and that 
subsequent response is a matter of selecting the closest match to this blend 
representation. Under certain retrieval conditions, one or other of the items 
or features 1 associated with that item may be made more salient than the other; 
if so, this item is selected. The modified test procedure (e.g. McCloskey & 
Zaragoza, 1985a), by not allowing the possibility of selecting the misleading 
suggestion, clearly weights response choice towards the original event item. In 
the yes/no tests employed by Tversky and Tuchin (1989), misled subjects 
often responded 'yes· to both the original and the misleading item, without 
seeing any contradiction in their responses; the memory therefore could be 
conceptualised as containing aspects of both items (although the alternative that 
both items exist separately would equally support this finding). 
Theoretical support for a memory integration hypothesis comes from the 
growing number of memory models which have as their central tenet the 
concept of composite storage (e.g. Eich, 1982; McClelland & Rumelhart, 1986; 
Anderson & Hinton, 1989). In these models representations from successive 
events are superimposed on one another and stored as collective patterns of 
'neural' networks. One such model is Eich's (1982) composite holographic 
associative recall model, or CHARM, in which the concept of memory blending 
falls out as a natural prediction of the model: 
"When two unrelated target items (B & D) have been associated 
with the same cue (A) and both associations have been stored in the 
composite trace, when the cue is correlated with the trace, the 
1 Features may not necessarily correspond to eyes, nose length, edges, bars, etc., 
but are assumed to be 'abstract' in nature and not obviously related to the item in 
question (e.g. see Metcalfe, 1990). 
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single item that is retrieved is a combination of both of the 
unrelated targets." 
(p. 683) 
A basic outline of the model is as follows: Items are represented in terms of 
vectors of features (which may be abstract in nature). Two items are 
associated together by means of the operation of convolution which roughly 
equates to associating all the features of one item with all the features of the 
other item. A "higher-order" composite trace results, which does not 
resemble, in any obvious way, either of the contributing items; numerous 
other associations may be added to this composite trace. Retrieval occurs by 
correlating the retrieval cue with the composite trace to obtain the associated 
item. This item is matched to each item in the lexicon; if the 'resonance' value 
or 'feature convergence' is above criterion level the item will be retrieved 
(this explanation is unavoidably brief - see Eich, 1982, 1985, for a more 
detailed account and accompanying mathematical proofs). In terms of the 
blending hypothesis, if two different items have been convoluted with the same 
cue, the single retrieval vector will match both the associated items. 
Subsequently, if these items are on some kind of psychologically plausible, 
continuous scale there may be another (blended) item which is a better match 
than either of the two separate components (Metcalfe, 1990). 
In a series of simulations (Metcalfe, 1990) the CHARM model neatly accounts 
for the empirical data of a wide range of experiments, including the original 
Loftus et. al (1978) design, the modified recognition test employed by 
McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985a), yes/no testing procedures (Belli, 1985; 
Tversky & Tuchin, 1989), as well as the blend memory experiments of Loftus 
(1977). The results of these experiments fall out naturally in the 
simulations; as Metcalfe (1990) states: 
"In the context of the model, one would say that the item 
retrieved from the composite memory trace may be a 
superimposition, but if no such entity exists as a lexical entry, 
then the model will be forced into an either/or or both 
decision." 
(p. 156) 
A recent article by Metcalfe and Bjork (1991) in response to debate over the 
usefulness of CHARM (Lindsay, 1991; Schooler & Tanaka, 1991 ), recants the 
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blend prediction of CHARM, or at least reduces it to an isolated possibility 
rather than a mandatory prediction of the model. Metcalfe and Bjork go on to 
suggest that in some cases a separate-trace model may also predict blended-
response outcomes. This debate is part of a wider issue (in the categorization 
literature) about whether information is represented in the form of summary 
prototypes (or integrated traces), or whether a separate trace, individual 
exemplar account is responsible for prototypicality effects and by extension 
blend responses. This issue, and the relation of the categorization literature to 
the misinformation effect is elucidated in the next section. Suffice to suggest at 
this point that these two, quite different, theoretical accounts are difficult to 
tease apart experimentally and often predict similar empirical results. 
A summary of the theoretical accounts outlined above suggests that in view of 
experiments which prove that retrieval of the original item is possible under 
some conditions, it appears unlikely that the event information is overwritten 
or irrevocably lost. Similarly, although demand characteristics and response 
bias no doubt play a part in the misinformation effect it is unlikely that they 
can account for all the differences in responding between control and misled 
subjects. The finding that people fail to tag the source of their memories and 
the possiblity that information may be somehow integrated in memory lends 
support to a general, but as yet vague, hypothesis that subjects have blended 
representations of the different items, while different retrieval conditions may 
determine the saliency of the 'features' of any given item and influence 
subsequent response selection. 
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Wider Theoretical Issues 
Psychologists (and philosophers) have often conceptualised memory as a 
veridical recall of previously stored items. All memories still exist and in 
pristine condition; all that is required for their recall is an appropriate 
retrieval environment. Greek philosophers analogised memory storage to 
imprinting in a wax tablet, with recollection seen as searching for an image in 
a corporeal substrate (see Kemp, 1991, for an overview of medieval and 
classical approaches). The putative limitless capacity of memory is extolled 
by Augustine: "Great is the power of memory, exceedingly great, oh my God - a 
large and boundless inner hall" (Augustine, cited in Hermann & Chaffin, 
1988; p. 113). These medieval and classical approaches have quite a modern 
ring about them. Memory has often been conceptualised by cognitive 
psychologists as a 'storehouse' or 'filing system' in which items are stored, 
organised and can be 'found' (with the appropriate cue) at a later date. It is 
assumed that recall reflects a veridical recollection of previously experienced 
events; something like playing back a tape or video cassette (Loftus & Loftus, 
1980, summarise these approaches). 
In the real world memory does not operate like this; it is far more dynamic and 
malleable. Bartlett (1932) repudiated a 'storehouse' approach and suggested 
that memory recall is more a process of inference and reconstruction than 
simple retrieval of a stored item. 
"The first notion to get rid of is that memory is primarily or 
literally reduplicative or reproductive. In a world of constantly 
changing environment, literal recall is extraordinarily 
unimportant." 
(Bartlett, 1932, p. 205) 
There are numerous examples in the autobiographical literature to suggest that 
people don't recall what actually happened but what they think happened. 
Furthermore, they may be unaware of the inaccurate nature of their memories 
(Jacoby, Kelley & Dywan, 1989). In addition, subjects in eyewitness memory 
experiments and in the courtroom are often as confident when they are wrong 
as when they are correct (e.g. Schooler et. al, 1986). Jacoby et. al {1989) 
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suggest that memory is an inference about the past and at a subjective level is 
similar to other affective reactions in its reliance on attributional processes. 
Bartlett (1932) emphasized the creative or reconstructive aspect of memory 
and suggested that: 
"... every normal individual must carry about with him an 
incalculable number of individual traces. Since these are all 
stored together in a single organism, they are in fact bound to be 
related one to another, and this gives recall its inevitably 
associative character." 
(p. 197) 
This quote has a prescient similarity to the approach adopted by a number of 
connectionist models of learning and memory. Connectionist models (e.g. 
McClelland & Rumelhart, 1986) postulate that information is not stored 
anywhere as such, but rather it is represented in the relationship among units 
(which are roughly analogous to neurons). Information therefore is stored in a 
distributed fashion and retrieval processes are characterised as an evocation of 
a previous pattern rather than a retrieval of appropriate items. Retrieving 
information is seen as analogous to tuning into a particular frequency. 
Although connectionist approaches have their limitations ( e.g. Norman, 1986; 
Schacter, 1989) they are useful in that generalization, revision and inference 
are inherent properties of the system. Although information is 'stored' as 
particular events, these events are represented in the form of a composite 
trace which yields generalizations of particular instances even though the 
generalizations are never stored directly. This account is useful for cutting 
across a central debate in the classification literature as to whether people 
represent categories by storing individual exemplars (e.g. Medin & Schaffer, 
1978; Hintzman, 1986; Nosofosky, 1991) or as unitary abstract 
representations or prototypes (e.g. Tulving, 1983). Memory blends, as found 
in the eyewitness memory literature, are seen as the "beginnings of the 
formulation of a summary representation and fall naturally out of distributed 
models" (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1986, p. 208). Experimentally, however, 
it is very difficult to tease apart exemplar and prototype models. The finding 
that subjects will recognize or select a blend item more quickly or over and 
above previously seen items of which it is constituted is commensurate with 
both an exemplar and a prototype approach. 
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Watkins (1990) suggests that the problem in discriminating between different 
theoretical approaches is a more fundamental one; that is, they all rely on the 
erroneous belief in a memory 'trace' or 'representation'. By eschewing the 
notion of traces, Watkins suggests that memory can be studied in terms of the 
actual experiences of remembering and the context in which remembering 
occurs. However, all he really suggests is that because we can't know what is 
happening (in the brain) in the interim between exposure to information and 
subsequent recall, we should therefore ignore all questions of storage and 
consequently 'traces'. His vitriolic is, in a way, more reasonably aimed at a 
subsection of brain scientists exclusively studying changes at a synaptic level, 
rather than cognitive psychologists who place considerable emphasis on 
environmental conditions and associated contextual parameters (e.g. Tulving, 
1983). Although it is assumed that the trace or engram is a metaphor for an 
as-yet-fully understood physiological and mentalistic process, it is difficult to 
completely remove the concept of memory representation without resorting to 
Skinnerian accounts of the mind. As Tulving (1991) points out: 
"When an event occurs that a person perceives and subsequently 
remembers, some changes must occur in the brain. That is, the 
brain is different before and after that event. We can call that 
before-after difference the engram, or the memory trace, or the 
representation of the event or whatever." 
(p. 89) 
He goes on to add that the engram does not exist independently of retrieval 
processes, i.e. the engram is an entity that can only manifest itself in retrieval 
activity. This engram-retrieval relationship he terms 'synergistic ecphory' 
which places emphasis on the type of cue and contextual conditions at the time 
of retrieval. Although it is hard to know exactly what 'traces' are, I would 
argue that this is not necessarily a good reason for completely ignoring them, 
or denying their existence. 
It would seem that we know more about what memory isn't than what it is. The 
idea that information is unlimitlessly 'stored' or 'filed away' accurately for 
veridical retrieval is clearly erroneous; memory retrieval can be 
conceptualised as both creative and reconstructive. Although (as Watkins 
points out) we can't know what is exactly in memory, in terms of theoretical 
parsimony (and known physiology of the brain) I think it reasonable to assume 
that information may be represented in terms of 'dynamic composite traces', 
which can yield blended or prototypical type responses under certain retrieval 
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conditions. Further evaluation of any theoretical model certainly requires 
corresponding advances in explorations of experimental variables and 
associated contextual information analysis. 
28 
Overview of the experiments 
As mentioned previously, an 'integration hypothesis' which posits either a 
blend representation of event and post-event items in memory or an 
integration of those (separate) items at the time of retrieval can account for 
the wide range of results found in the eyewitness memory literature. Examples 
explicitly designed to test the possibility of 'memory blending' by using 
stimuli on some kind of continuous scale are few; with the studies by Loftus 
.. (1977) and Belli (1988) as the only relevant examples~ There are problems 
however with both these experiments in that they used recognition memory for 
colour as the dependent variable. As Metcalfe and Bjork (1991) point out, 
people probably have quite different subjective opinions of what exactly 'blue' 
or 'green' means to them in terms of specific hues. Furthermore, adaptation to 
the level of ambient light or small variations in the lighting conditions at event 
and test may have confounded the results ir, that the colour 'green' (or 'blue') 
at test might not precisely match the actual colour seen. 
Metcalfe (1990) suggests faces can be represented on a continuous scale in 
terms of feature lengths and ratios etc., and are a potentially very important 
class of stimuli with respects to the yewitness memory literature. From an 
applied perspective witnesses recognition of faces plays a large part in suspect 
identification and subsequent conviction. 
The current experiments were designed to allow the possibility of 'memory 
blend' responses by using schematic, computer generated line-drawings of 
faces. A caricature generator developed by S. Brennan (1985, cited in Rhodes, 
Brennan & Carey, 1987) allows the possibility of creating blended faces: Two 
faces are averaged together to form a third face - a mathematical average of the 
first two. Weighting the blend towards one of its components Is also possible by 
adding one of the faces into the blend twice or more. It is possible therefore, to 
construct a continuous scale of faces which change in gradual increments from 
one face towards another. 
Specifically two experiments were carried out using the misinformation effect 
paradigm to determine: 
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(1) Whether misleading, interpolated information will affect subjects' 
memory response for an original item, and 
(2) Whether, when misled, subjects will select a blended (never before seen) 
item more frequently than either the original or misleading item. 
If subjects are impaired in their ability to recognize an original face after the 
presentation of an interpolated face, this would support the legion of evidence 
demonstrating such misinformation effects. If a blend face is selected more 
frequently than the other choices (by misled subjects) support would be 
garnered for an integration or memory blending hypothesis, as well as adding 
empirical support to a number of theoretical models, which predict composite 
storage, or integration during retrieval processes. 
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Experiment 1 
The hypotheses of this experiment are as follows: Control subjects are 
expected to select the original face significantly more than misled subjects, 
while misled subjects are expected to select the blended face more often than 




207 Stage 1 psychology students participated as part of a laboratory class: 105 
subjects in the misled condition and 102 subjects in the control condition. 
Stimuli 
The stimuli used in Experiment 1 consisted of a series of 21 cartoon-like 
slides, along with six slides of computer generated line-drawings of faces. 
There were four slides of individual faces and two test slides comprised of four 
faces each. The faces were produced by a caricature generator which uses 
digitized photographs of people's faces to produce line drawings. Overall two 
sets of faces were used. The faces consisted of veridical line drawings based on 
photographs of members of the Stanford University psychology department and 
two faces which represented mathematical averages of the two different faces 
used in each of the stimuli sets. The caricature generator creates the averaged 
faces by comparing each of 169 points of the two different faces and taking the 
intermediate or mean position on each point between the two faces to construct 
the third, averaged face (examples of the stimuli used in Experiment i are 
shown in Appendix 1 ). 
Design and procedure: 
Subjects were tested .in their laboratory class in groups of 25-30; they were 
told that they would be presented with a series of slides which they should pay 
close attention to, as they might be tested on some of the items. 
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A series of 12 black and white cartoon-like slides depicting the theft of a wallet 
were shown for 4 seconds each. A computer technician was seen entering a 
room, examining a broken computer terminal, fixing the terminal, then spying 
a wallet on the table, putting that wallet in his bag, and leaving the room. The 
critical slide embedded in this sequence was that of a computer generated line-
drawing of a male face: the technician in question. All subjects then 
participated in a two minute filler activity (reading a story). A further nine 
slides were shown continuing the sequence of events - the technician leaves the 
building by means of an elevator and drives off in a vehicle parked outside the 
building. The 105 misled subjects received a further slide depicting a 
different (but similar) computer generated face, assumed to be the technician. 
The 102 control subjects did not receive this additional slide. Two different 
pairs of faces were used and were counterbalanced so that each face was equally 
often seen as the original or interpolated item. After a further two minute 
interval subjects were shown a single slide of four faces (see Figure 1 ). The 
slide compromised of: (1) the original face, (2) the interpolated face, (3) a 
blend of these two, and (4) a completely novel face. Subjects were asked to 
select which face looked most like the computer technician depicted in the first 







As can be seen in Figure 2, 56.86% of control subjects selected the original 
face whereas 30.40% selected the blend face, 11.76% the interpolated face 
(which wasn't viewed by control subjects) and 0.98% selected the novel face. 
In comparison to these results the most frequently selected face for misled 
subjects was the blend face (40.95%), followed by the interpolated (30.48%) 
and the original (27.62%) face. The novel item was only selected by 0.95% of 
the subjects. Calculations of significant differences between proportions for 
the two groups revealed that the control subjects more often selected the 
original face as compared to misled subjects [z(207)=4.51, p<.05] whereas 
misled subjects were more likely-to select the interpolated item than were 
control subjects [z(207)=1.61, p<.051-) Although more misled subjects 
~- ---------------- ----~------------
( 40. 95%) selected the blend face than did contro} subjects (30.40%) this 
difference was not significant [z(207)=1.61, p<.0§J) (see Appendix 2 for 
details of analyses). / 
Discussion 
Overall, the basic misinformation effect was reproduced. Subjects who had 
been presented with an interpolated item were subsequently impaired in their 
selection of the original item as compared with controls. While the blend item 
seemed to be the most favoured by misled subjects, a large number also selected 
the interpolated and original item. The finding that control subjects did not 
differ significantly in their selection of the blend item from misled subjects 
was a little surprising, although it probably reflects the similarity between 
the blend and original item, and the wider dispersion of responses among the 
three main items in the misled group. One other possible reason why the blend 
is 'recognized' so readily is that it may be less distinctive than the other faces. 
Recent research suggests (e.g. Valentine & Bruce, 1986) that while highly 
distinctive faces are recognized more quickly than less distinctive faces, 
average faces are more often erroneously recognized; that is, subjects are more 
likely to say they have seen a never-before-presented, typical face than a non-
typical face. Perhaps also, a wider range of blend choices might reveal the kind 
of selection shift found in the Loftus (1977) experiment. The second 
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experiment was designed to evaluate these possibility and to collect the 
additional measures of face typicality and confidence in responding. 
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30 subjects with ages ranging from 17 to 25 participated voluntarily in this 
experiment. 
Stimuli 
The stimuli in Experiment 2 consisted of two sets of nine faces, all produced 
using the caricature generator described in Experiment 1. For each 
experimental condition there were eight slides of individual faces, four with 
names written underneath and four with the names blanked out, and one slide 
which consisted of six faces which represented the novel, original, misleading 
and blend alternatives. A continuum of blend faces from the original to the 
misleading face was constructed by weighting two of the blend faces to either 
the original or misleading face. This continuum is illustrated in Figure 3. 
37 
.j -
E;xQM?k!5 o~ 'Shmu Ii w se.ct IY) 
t:xp~ri~f\t ~- ~ Aum\o~,s ,·n 
brqc,:.~t.s r~?~S~l')T ih~ pE:!.rC-eAtc,ae 













Design and procedure: 
All subjects participated In separate control and misled conditions and were 
counterbalanced so that half of the subjects participated in the control condition 
first and half of the subjects participated in the misleading condition first. 
Subjects were told that the experiment involved viewing a number of faces 
which they should pay close attention to as they may be asked to recognize them 
later. Initially four slides of computer-generated schematic faces with names 
written underneath were shown for 4 seconds each. The faces were either all 
male or all female within a single block. Subjects were told that "these are 
four people whom you meet at a party". After a two minute interval in which 
... .... the ~xpefirheht~r bhatied with the subjects, subjects either received audibly ·.· .. 
{at 4 second Intervals) the four names of the subjects viewed previously or 
else received four more faces, with the names blanked over but read out at the 
presentation of each slide. Three of these slides were of the same faces seen in 
the first section, while a fourth was a different face but tagged with the same 
name as the original slide. This misleading slide and its original counterpart 
were counterbalanced so each face was prf:ls~mted as eiU,er the original or the 
misleading face an equal number of times. After a further two minute interval 
subjects were shown a single slide which consisted of six different faces. The 
faces comprised of (1) the original (100), (2) a blend between the original 
and misleading face weighted two times in favour of the original (67), (3) a 
blend between the original and misleading face (50), (4) a blend weighted two 
times in favour of the misleading face (33), (5) the misleading face (0}, and 
(6) a novel face. The ordering of the faces on the slide was random and 
counterbalanced so that each face was seen (roughly) equally often in each 
position. Subjects were asked "which face (A, B, C, D, E or F} looks most like 
the person __ [name of the original face presented] depicted in the first set 
of slides? (If you can't remember the name of the person simply select the 
face which looks most like (the) one which you viewed in the first set of 
slides}." Subjects were also asked to supply an indication of how confident 
they were with this selection on a seven point scale: 1, being not confident at 
all, 7 being very confident. Finally subjects were asked to rate (on a seven 
point scale} each face on distinctiveness: 1 being an undistinctive face, 7 being 
a very distinctive face. Distinctiveness was described as how easy the face 
would be to pick out from a crowd. 
Results 
For analysis each possible response face was given a number reflecting the 
proportion of the original face in the item, so that 0 represented the misleading 
face, 33 the blend face weighted in favour of the misleading face, 50 the 
average blend face, 67 the blend face weighted in favour of the original face, 
and 100 the original face. This enabled a comparison of mean responding 
between the control and misled group. The mean selection of the 30 control 
subjects was 73.93, whereas the 30 misled subjects produced a mean of 
49.50. This difference was significant: t{29)=3.38, p<.01. Thus the 
introduction of the misleading face significantly affected a group of subjects in 
their recognition selection of the original viewed item. The distribution of 
responses (Figure 4) illustrates that misled subjects' shifted their preferred 
selection towards the equal blend face as compared to controls. While 43.39% 
of control subjects selected the original face only 13% did so from the misled 
group. Conversely, 30% of misled subjects chose the equal blend as compared 
with 16.67% of controls. In faqt, the rnean seleqtion rE3sponsE3 for misled 
subjects did not differ significantly from the number represented by the blend 
face (50): t{29)=0.088, p>.05, whereas the control subjects' responding did 
not differ significantly from the blend item weighted towards the original face 
(67): t(29)=1.44, p>.05; but did differ from both the blend item (50): 
t(2.9)=5.18, p<.01, and the original face (100): t(29)=5.62, p<.01. 
Analysis of the confidence ratings revealed that subjects were significantly 
more confident in the control group as compared to misled subjects: 
t(29)=2.78, p<.01. The typicality ratings, analysed using repeated measures 
t-tests, revealed that the blend faces in ail but one case were rated as 
significantly more 'typical' than either of the two faces of which they 
comprised (see Table 3). The relation of these results to response selection 
are discussed more fully in the general discussion below. 
Face Face Set 1 Face Set 2 
A 3.40 4.93* 
APB 3.50 4.30 
MBB 3. 77* 3 .97* 
ABB 3.77 4.30 
B 4.60* 4.60* 
40 
(1 = low distinctiveness; 7 = high distinctiveness} 
* p<.05 
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Discussion 
The main misinformation effect was again replicated in Experiment 2. 
Subjects who had been exposed to misleading information, in the form of 
interpolated faces, were less likely to select the original face and opted instead 
for a blend item which consisted of both the original and misleading faces. The 
finding that misled subjects were less confident about their selection choices 
than were control subjects was probably due to the increased difficulty in 
selecting the appropriate face in the misled condition. Misled subjects had a 
selection of six faces, all of which were very simlar o(and two the same as) 
previously viewed items. Subjects in the control group, by not viewing the 
misleading face had less faces which were familiar only one of the faces was 
viewed before with the other faces gradually decreasing in similarity from this 
face. 
The finding that the blend faces were rated as more typical than their 
constituents was not surprising; presumably blend faces are more 'average' 
and thus overall less distinctive than individual exemplars. Although, as 
discussed below, the difference in typicality can not adequately account for why 





The results of both experiments show effects of misleading or interpolated 
material on memory for an original event. Subjects who received 
misinformation in the form of schematic faces which differed from the 
originally presented faces were subsequently impaired on a recognition test in 
that they were less likely to select the face which was originally presented. 
}"he experiments replicate the findings of numerous studies in the field, and 
more specifically, studies by Gibling and Davies (1988) and Jenkins and ..• 
Davies (1985}, who also employed face stimuli to find a misinformation effect. 
The finding that misled subjects were as, or more, likely to select the blend 
face over the other alternatives replicates the previous studies carried out on 
blending (using colour stimuli) by Loftus (1977} and Belli (1988}. The shift 
in response selection from the original face to the blended one was most clearly 
illustrated in Experiment 2: Overall 66.67% of misled subjects chose one of 
the three blended options with only 13.33% selecting the original face. While 
the blended items were also popular for control subjects (56.67%) 
significantly more subjects chose the correct original item (43.39%} than In 
the misled group. 
How do we account for these results within the framework of theoretical 
options delineated earlier? -
Demand characteristics 
Perhaps misled subjects remembered both event and post-event faces and chose 
the blend item as a deliberate compromise selection; that is, their response 
reflected a desire to be at least partially correct. Although it is impossible to 
completely rule out the possibility of demand characteristics it seems highly 
unlikely that subjects could retain a veridical representation of both items in 
memory so that they could consciously select a blend item in between the two. 
Face recall as such is notoriously difficult and probably only eidetic imagers 
could consciously select a compromise option even if they realised that one or 
more of the faces presented represented a blend of two of the previously viewed 
items. 
Response bias 
According to this argument (e.g. McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985a) subjects 
should perform more poorly in the misled condition for non-memory reasons. 
While control subjects who 'forget' the original item select an option at chance 
level, misled subjects (who forget the event information) are biased into 
selecting the misleading alternative. Clearly this argument can't explain why 
misled subjects preferred a blended item over the misleading one. If they 
forget the original information then the misleading item should be more 
frequently chosen. As this was not the case, response bias is unlikely to play a 
part in the pattern of results which were found. 
Overwriting/destructive updating 
Although this idea probably has little credence in the literature anyway, the 
finding that misled subjects select the blend item quite frequently implies that 
at least some aspects or 'features' of the original face are present in the 
system. It is unlikely then that the new, interpolated material completely 
overwrites or updates a previously presented item. 
Source misattributions 
According to the source misattribution hypothesis, subjects retain one or both 
items of information but are unsure of the source of their memory. The short 
retention intervals, and the similarity between event and post-event 
environments in the two experiments probably facilitates the possibility of 
source errors. Although in the second experiment the post-event slides had 
blanked out names which were read out as opposed to being viewed in the event, 
this might not have been enough to accurately discriminate between the two 
sources. Brown, Deffenbacher and Sturgill (1977) found that face recognition 
was much better than recall of the source of the familiarity; as Jacoby et. al 
(1986) point out, familiarity does not specify its source, but rather the 
source is attributed to a particular situation depending on the nature of the 
experimental environment. Although source mistakes probably did occur in 
this experiment, they still can't adequately account for the blend preference 
effect. If subjects were unsure of the source of their memory (be it an event 
or post-event item) on what basis would they select a never-before-seen blend 
over either of the previously viewed items? 
Typicality 
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One possibility, as noted in the results section• of Experiment 1, is that if 
typical faces are more likely to be erroneously recognised as items seen before 
than non-typical faces, perhaps the blend selection can be explained in terms of 
the typicality of the blend face. Although the a posteriori distinctiveness 
ratings do indicate that the blend faces were rated as more typical than their 
constituents, a preference based entirely on typicality can't explain why 
control subjects significantly more often chose the original face (56.9% in 
Experiment 1} over the blended item (30.40%). In the second experiment 
although the blend faces were selected quite frequently by control subjects, the 
original item was chosen (43.39%} more often than the equal blend (16.67%) 
or the blend weighted towards the original item (26.67%}. While typicality 
can't be ruled out as a basis for selection in the misled group, the control 
subjects seemed to base their selection in both experiments on the similarity of 
the item to the original face and not to the most typical one. 
Coexistence/Integration 
The most parsimonious explanation of blend memory results is that 
information is either integrated in memory to form a unitary representation of 
the two different items, or else the two pieces of information reside separately 
and are blended together at the time of retrieval. A third alternative is that the 
different items reside separately in memory with subsequent recognition 
judgements being based on the overall summed similarity of the separately 
residing exemplars. An examination of the classification literature is useful 
for evaluating the viability of these three options. Although the number of 
stimuli may be too small to be commensurate with normal categorization 
studies, at the very least, blend memory results can be indicative of the 
beginnings of summary representation type phenomena. 
A prototype approach would favour the idea that the two different faces are 
blended together in memory to form a prototype face which is subsequently 
selected on recognition tests. It should be noted however that Valentine and 
Bruce (1986) believe that there is only one face prototype which cannot really 
be manipulated during psychology experiments. However, Valentine and Bruce 
(1986) failed to supply any empirical support for this idea and there seems no 
reason why a prototype face cannot be formed on the basis of a limited number 
of exemplars and in the context of a single experiment. An exemplar approach, 
in contrast to a prototypical account, assumes that each event gives rise to 
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distinct and different episodic traces, with abstract knowledge (e.g. blends) 
being derived from the pool of traces of these events or experiences, at the time 
of retrieval {Hintzman, 1986). An exemplar approach as espoused by 
Nosofsky (1991) seems useful in capturing the important aspects of the 
current experimental findings. Nosofsky postulates that: 
"People represent categories by storing individual exemplars in 
memory, and make classification [or recognition] decisions on the 
basis of similarity comparisons with the stored exemplars." 
(p. 3) 
Recognition decisions therefore are based on the absolute summed similarity of 
any given item to all 'stored' exemplars. 
"This absolute summed similarity gives a measure of overall 
familiarity with high familiarity values leading to higher 
recognition probabilities." 
(Nosofsky, 1991, p. 3) 
The results of both Experiment 1 and 2 illustrate this theoretical idea quite 
clearly: For control subjects {in Experiment 2) the original item (e.g. the 
face 'Jenny') is closest in similarity (not surprisingly) to the originally 
viewed face 'Jenny'. Assuming some 'noise' in the system recognition 
performance is not perfect (43.39%). The next closest item in terms of 
similarity is the blend face which comprises of two 'Jennies' and one 'Jane'; 
this blend was selected the next most often (26.67%). The equal 'Jenny/Jane· 
blend was the next most popular (16.67%), while the blend weighted in favour 
of 'Jane' was selected by 13.33% of subjects. The face 'Jane' and the novel 
item (which were dissimilar to 'Jenny') were not selected at all. For misled 
subjects the item which was most similar to all (both) of the stored exemplars 
was the equal blend, which was selected the most often (30%). The other two 
(weighted) blends were the next most similar items; overall being selected by 
36.67% of subjects, with the actually viewed items being selected by a 
combined 33.33% of subjects. The distribution of selections in the misled 
condition were naturally more spread and no doubt other variables such as the 
relative 'accessibility' of the various items influences overall similarity 
judgements. 
Although the usefulness of adopting a exemplar based model is most clearly seen 
within the context of blend experiments, it could also account for more general 
findings in the misinformation effect literature. Consider the Loftus et. al 
(1978) experiments: subjects with memory 'traces' for both the stop and 
47 
give way sign (i.e. misled subjects) base their final recognition decision on 
overall similarity between the two alternatives presented at the test and the 
two items present in the experiment. Assuming only one item can be correct 
the subject selects the give way sign because it involves a higher overall 
recognition 'signal' (perhaps because the information is more recent, or more 
salient). In the design employed by McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985a}, the 
original item (screwdriver) is preferred by both control and misled subjects; 
it is certainly more similar to previously encountered item(s) than a 
completely novel item (wrench). Where possible (e.g. Tversky & Tuchin, 
1989) subjects may well select both original and misled items if they both 
reach 'criterion' similarity levels and the choices are reasonable with regards 
to the experirnental context. 
Although a summed similarity model may be the most parsimonious account for 
explaining the results found in eyewitness memory experiments, both 
prototype and exemplar models could be similarly used to account for the same 




Whereas experiments designed to differentiate between the three theoretical 
options outlined above are difficult to conduct, the extent of blend responding 
found may differ under different experimental conditions. For example, 
manipulating retention intervals and the discriminabillty between the two 
sources of information may decrease (or increase) the degree of blend 
responding found. That is, if subjects can actively tease apart the source of 
their memories, by use of explicit warnings and/or high discriminability 
between the event a.nd post~evelit faces; perhaps the saliency of th~ 
subsequently presented blend faces, in terms of performance on a recognition 
test, would be decreased. If subjects still select blend responses even when 
source is clearly delineated, this may tell us something about blending 
processes in general (they could be an implicit aspect of brain systems) and 
face recognition in particular (that it Is source independent). 
The presentation of different but not misleading faces within a particular 
experimental environment may well lead to innocent bystander effects: With 
the non-target or indeed blend faces being selected as, or more often than, the 
target item. This finding would be interesting from an applied perspective: If 
people are happy to Integrate information from different faces derived from the 
same source, erroneous identification of suspects might occur. 
The possibility that subjects base all recognition decisions on summed 
similarity to stored exemplars suggests that manipulations in similarity among 
faces presented may influence subsequent responding. If the original and 
interpolated face are highly similar the distribution of responses should be 
more spread out; assuming that the two i,tems and all the blends look very much 
alike. When similarity between event and post-event faces is quite low, the 
two 'end' faces in a blend continuum maybe chosen somewhat less frequently. 
Although highly disparate items would probably enable subjects to pick up the 
discrepancy and therefore 'ignore' the misleading item. Certainly the use of 
face stimuli (as realised by the caricature generator) offers a wide range of 
experimental manipulations and further research is probably necessary to fine 
tune the type of theoretical explanations used to account for the data in these 
and other experiments. 
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Applied perspectives 
While the major thrust of this paper and indeed the majority of the eyewitness 
memory literature is primarily theoretical in nature, the experiments 
demonstrating misinformation effects have obvious real world applications. 
The early Loftus experiments by utilizing more 'naturalistic' experimental 
settings, aimed In part to evaluate the veridicality of courtroom testimonies. 
The finding that subjects will, under conditions roughly analogous to real-
world testimonies, report information presupposed but not seen (and be 
........................... 
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confident in those reports) casts doubts on the reliability ot eyewitness ·· 
testimonies. 
Although it has been argued by some (see Goodman & Loftus, 1989) that 
experimental studies are not applicable to the real world, Loftus and Goodman 
(1989) suggest: 
"What is generalisable to real~world settings is not so much the 
specific findings of a given variable in a given study, but the 
processes underlying that variable." 
In other words a realisation of the theoretical mechanisms underpinning 
misinformation effects can be useful in attempting to increase the efficacy of 
courtroom testimony. 
One area that has received considerable experimental interest and is critical in 
eyewitness reporting is that of face recognition (see Laughery & Wogalter, 
1989, for a meta-analysis of over 100 studies). Several important variables 
seem to determine the accuracy of face recognition: Retention interval, 
intervening faces, and context. Face recognition, like most aspects of memory 
performance, decreases in accuracy with increasing retention intervals. 
Although recognition ability seems to be relatively stable up to a two-week 
period (Davies, 1989), recognition performance begins to decline sharply at 
longer retention Intervals. The implications for eyewitness procedures are 
clear: subjects should be involved in identifying the suspect face in question as 
soon as possible. Another quite robust finding, and one supported by the 
current experiments, is that identification accuracy decreases as the number of 
intervening faces increases and as the similarity among the faces increases. 
Numerous studies (e.g. Brown et. al, 1977; Gibling & Davies, 1988; Jenkins & 
Davies, 1985) have found erroneous reporting of interpolated faces (assumed 
to be the suspect) which were not originally viewed in a crime sequence, but 
were later presented in the form of mug-shots or photo spreads. In addition to 
this, Loftus (1976; cited in Laughery & Wogalter, 1989 
) found that a face may be wrongly selected if it was exposed near it time to the 
event: the so-called innocent bystander effect. These studies highlight the 
difficulty in attributing source to previously viewed faces; with overall 
familiarity seeming to be the main criterion for recognition selection. It is 
important, as Davies (1989) points out, that the witness at the parade not only 
recognises a suspect as familiar but also can locate them in the appropriate 
context. 
One important variable which seems to increase the accuracy of face 
recognition is context reinstatement. As with other areas of memory research, 
reinstating the context of the original environment facilitates subsequent 
memory performance. Cutler and Penrod (1988) in a meta-analysis of 
context reinstatement studies suggests that there is a large effect of context on 
subsequent recognition for faces which is most apparent when the memory for 
to-be-remembered face is impaired. 
The studies carried out on face blending presented in the present paper 
illustrate the difficulty of face recognition when source and context cues are 
unavailable and when intervening faces (similar to the target} precede a 
recognition test. The main factors which should be taken into account in real-
world situations are: Firstly, a realisation of the possible inaccuracy of face 
identification; secondly, the usefulness of source cueing through context 
reinstatement; and thirdly, the Importance of obtaining as much information 
about the suspect's face from the witness prior to looking at photo spreads or 
mug files. 
Conclusion 
A general distillation of the eyewitness memory literature reveals one major, 
but important, finding: when post-event information is presented to subjects 
in one form or another their subsequent memory reporting for original 
information is impaired. The wider implication of this finding is that memory 
is not a veridical, 'stenographic' process, but one which probably has 
reconstructive and inferential properties as central to its functioning. The 
finding that subjects, who have been presented with interpolated faces, will 
select a blended face option (on a recognition test) more frequently than 
alternatives actually presented lends support to a loosely connected farrago of 
theoretical models. Distributed models of memory that postulate 'composite 
trace' storage capture the essential elements of individual trace integrity along 
with an abstraction of object or concept from the overlay of similar items. An 
exemplar approach to recognition in which items are judged as 'familiar' on 
the basis of overall summed similarity to 'separately' stored exemplars is 
useful in capturing the central aspects of the results presented on face 
blending. Although a summed similarity model is perhaps the most 
parsimonious theoretical account, both a prototype and a separate trace 
retrieval integration model could also account for the type of misinformation 
effects found in the blending experiments. Variables operating at encoding and 
retrieval such as warnings and context reinstatement have been shown to 
attenuate the misinformation effect, probably in terms of reducing the saliency 
of post-event information and in effect precluding as a possible option on the 
subsequent recognition (or recall) test. The difficulty subjects have in making 
source attributions contributes to the overall misinformation effect, although 
the reporting of misinformation is probably not due entirely to source 
misattribution. Finally, eyewitness memory experiments which demonstrate 
the mutability of memory as illustrated by erroneous reporting of misleading 
items have important applied applications. The accuracy of witness 
identification can in some cases be questionable, especially when similar 
intervening items precedes subsequent identification. 
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Condition Original Blend Interpolated 
Control .569 .304 .118 
Misled .276 .409 .305 
Mean proportion of subjects who selected each response type In the misled and 





Tests for significant differences between proportions 
1. Original face: Control = .569 
z = p p 
✓P(1-P) + P(1-P) 
N N 
= .569 - .276 
Misled = .276 




z = 4.507 
z(207) = 4.507, p < .05 
61 
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2. Blend face: Control = .304 Misled = .41 0 
z = .40 .304 





z(207) = 1.61, p > .05 /ls: 
63 
3. Misleading face: Control = .118 Misled = .305 
z = .1 i 8 .305 





z(207) = 3.40, p < .05 
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Raw data for Experiment 2: See sheets. 
1 = Typical, 7 = Not Typical 
s Jane Jane(2)/Jenny Jane/Jenny Jane/Jenny(2) 
1 5 4 5 5 
2 5 3 4 2 
3 4 5 3 5 
4 5 4 1 5 
5 5 4 4 4 
6 5 4 5 4 
7 4 7 4 6 
8 5 7 4 3 
9 4 3 5 3 
1 0 4 5 5 3 
.. 11 ... 5. ... 4 3 6 
1 2 5 .. 4 3 4 
13 7 4 3 4 
1 4 5 4 4 6 
1 5 5 3 4 4 
1 6 7 3 5 4 
1 7 6 3 5 6 
1 8 4 4 3 3 
1 9 6 5 3 2 
20 5 4 5 6 
21 4 4 4 3 
22 4 7 5 6 
23 4 4 4 4 
24 6 3 5 3 
25 5 4 5 3 
26 5 5 3 5 
27 5 5 3 4 
28 5 5 4 5 
29 4 4 4 4 
30 5 4 3 4 
Experiment 2 
































































0 = Misleading face 
33 = 33% of original face 
50 = 50% of original face 
67 = 67% of original face 


































































































































1 = Low Distinctiveness 

































































TYPICALITY - Male 
Where 1 = Typical, 7 = Not Typical 
s Bob Bob(2)/Brian Bob/Brian Bob/Brian(2) 
1 4 4 2 2 
2 2 4 4 5 
3 4 2 4 5 
4 3 1 6 6 
5 3 4 2 4 
6 2 6 4 4 
7 3 3 6 4 
8 4 3 4 6 
9 5 3. 4 5 
1 0 4 4 ·.·. 6 .. ..... 2 . 
1 1 4 2 5 5 
1 2 4 3 2 4 
1 3 2 4 3 3 
1 4 2 2 3 3 
1 5 3 2 4 4 
1 6 6 3 2 2 
17 4 4 2 2 
1 8 3 4 5 6 
1 9 4 4 4 4 
20 3 3 4 4 
21 3 3 3 3 
22 4 2 3 3 
23 4 4 5 6 
24 4 3 4 4 
25 3 3 4 4 
26 3 3 3 5 
27 2 5 5 4 
28 4 5 3 4 
29 3 5 4 5 
30 3 6 4 4 
Appendix Five 




Face Response as % of original face presented 










Percentage of subjects who selected each face in the misled and control 
condition of Experiment 2. 
I-Tests (Face Response Choice) 
t= Ld 
✓NI,d~ - (Z:,d}"" 







t(29) = 3.38, p < .001 
71 
I-Tests (Response Choice between Options) 
Control selection (x = 73.93) and original option (100) 
t (29) = x - x o 
~ .. -
✓N -x. 






t(29) = -5.62, p < .001 
72 
73 
Control selection (x = 73.93) and 67% original option 






t(29) = 1.49, p > .05 
Control selection (x = 73.93) and 50% original option 
= 73.93 - 50 
4.64 
= 5.16 
t(29) = 5.16, p < .01 
74 
Misled selection (x .,_ 49.50) and 50% original option 
= 






t(29} = -0.088, p > .05 
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T-Test: Confidence ratings of control and misled subjects 
t = ___I._d 
✓Nid~ - (Id) 2 
N - 1 
= 27 
✓30.117-(27) 2 




t (29} = 2.78, p < .01 
76 
T-Test Typicality Ratings: Jane/50% Blend (Jenny/Jane) 
t = _I._g_ 
NI:d2 -(Ydf2 
N - 1 
= ...3.Q 
✓3 0 . 7 8 -( 3 0 ) 2 




t(29) = 4.26, p < .01 
77 
Jenny/50% Blend (Jenny/Jane} 
= 20 
✓20.56 - {20)2 













t(29} = 1.81, p > .05 
79 
Blend (Brian/Bob)/Brian 
t = _22 
✓30.108-(30)2 




t(29) = 2.45, p < .05 
80 
